EquiDiary
Security & privacy

ASVS 5.0 self-assessment: Levels 1 and 2

Level 1 completed 25 October 2026, Level 2 on 31 October 2026

This self-assessment covers all 70 Level 1 requirements and the 183 additional Level 2 requirements in the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 5.0. Each result explains how a requirement is met, or why it is not. The plain-language summary is on the security page.

Current scope: Levels 1 and 2. Level 1 was completed on . The assessment was extended to Level 2 on , replacing the earlier Level 1-only assessment. The Level 1 results include two requirements met by a different route and nine that do not apply. Level 2 is not fully met: 10 requirements are not met, by choice.

This is the developer’s self-assessment, not an independent audit or OWASP certification. The scope, method, results and limitations are published below.

What was assessed, and how

The requirement names in the tables are our own short summaries; the standard has the exact wording of each.

Jump to Level 1, Level 2, met by a different route, or not met, by choice.

Level 1

V1 Encoding and sanitization

RequirementResultHow it is met
1.2.1 Output encoding fits its contextMetEverything shown in the app is HTML-escaped where it is inserted, or set as plain text. File-name headers are built in a restricted ASCII form plus RFC 5987; calendar text is escaped per RFC 5545. The Content-Security-Policy forbids inline scripts as a second line.
1.2.2 URLs built safelyMetNo link is rendered from user input. Phone links are filtered to digits and dial characters, research links are built from the DOI over https, and file links are generated by the server.
1.2.3 JavaScript and JSON encodingMetJSON is produced only by the framework’s serializer. No script is built from data, and the pages have no inline scripts.
1.2.4 Database injectionMetEvery query binds its values as parameters. The few SQL fragments assembled in code are constants, never input.
1.2.5 OS command injectionNot applicableThe service runs on Cloudflare Workers, which has no operating-system commands to call.
1.3.1 Rich-text sanitizationNot applicableNo HTML or rich-text input is accepted: everything users type is plain text, escaped on output. Research abstracts from outside are reduced to plain text before they are stored.
1.3.2 No dynamic code executionMetNo eval, new Function or string timers, and the CSP does not allow them.
1.5.1 XML parsersNot applicableNo XML is parsed anywhere; every integration speaks JSON.

V2 Validation and business logic

RequirementResultHow it is met
2.1.1 Validation rules documentedMetA table kept with the code gives the rule for every data item: names (120 characters), notes (4,000), new passwords (8 to 200), real calendar dates, times, prices (0 to 1,000,000,000), ids, lists, and uploads (photos 5 MB, PDFs 10 MB).
2.2.1 Input checked against expectationsMetEach field is read through a validator that accepts only the expected type, format, range or set — a date that exists, a role from a fixed list, bounded numbers and lengths — and refuses the request otherwise. The database repeats the closed sets as constraints.
2.2.2 Validation on the serverMetAll checks run on the server and in the database. Checks in the app, such as the horse limit or a video’s length, are repeated there.
2.3.1 Steps in order, none skippedMetEmailed links work once and are claimed in a single statement. A temporary password allows nothing until it is replaced. A subscription becomes active only when the payment provider says so, never because the browser came back from checkout, and a video counts as ready only when the video service reports it.

V3 Web frontend security

RequirementResultHow it is met
3.2.1 Content not rendered in the wrong contextMetUploaded files are served only for the contexts the app uses them in — as an image or video, on their own, or fetched by the app — and refused when requested as a frame, embed, script or stylesheet (judged by Sec-Fetch-Dest). Photos and videos also carry a sandboxed, deny-everything policy, every response carries X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and file types are verified at upload.
3.2.2 Text rendered as textMetText reaches the page through textContent or an HTML-escaping function, everywhere. The one piece of markup a script writes without escaping, the tag that loads the reader’s language, holds nothing but a language code from a fixed list.
3.3.1 Secure cookiesMetThe one cookie is __Host-eq_session: Secure, Path=/, no Domain, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax. Check: sign in and read the Set-Cookie header.
3.4.1 HSTS for at least a yearMetEvery response carries Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains. Check: curl -sI https://app.equidiary.com.
3.4.2 CORS restrictedMetNo Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is ever sent, so no other origin can read a response.
3.5.1 Cross-site request forgeryMetA request that changes anything must come from the app’s own origin, judged from Sec-Fetch-Site and Origin; sibling subdomains are refused too. Only the two payment webhooks are exempt, being authenticated by signature, and the address browsers send reports of what a page’s security policy refused to, which changes nothing.
3.5.2 No way around the CORS preflightMetWrites that carry data as JSON must be sent as application/json, which another site cannot send without a preflight — and none is granted. The rest — file uploads and voice dictation, which are multipart forms, and starting a checkout — could be sent by another site without one, so for those the app does not rely on the preflight: they are refused by the origin check in 3.5.1, and a post from another site carries no session cookie in the first place (SameSite=Lax).
3.5.3 Safe methods stay safeMetEvery change is a POST, PUT or DELETE. GET requests only read; the one exception notes when a calendar feed was last fetched.

V4 API and web service

RequirementResultHow it is met
4.1.1 Content-Type with charsetMetEvery text response names UTF-8, and JSON is served as application/json.
4.4.1 WebSockets over TLSNot applicableNo WebSockets.

V5 File handling

RequirementResultHow it is met
5.2.1 Upload size limitedMet12 MB per request; photos 5 MB, PDFs 10 MB, voice clips 4 MB; a cap on files per entry and per horse; videos at most 3 minutes each, enforced by the video service as well.
5.2.2 Extension and content agreeMetThe type must be on an allowlist (JPEG, PNG, WebP, PDF), the file’s first bytes must match it, and the stored extension comes from the verified type. The uploaded file name never names or serves a file; it is kept only as a passport or paper’s title when none is typed.
5.3.1 Uploads never executedMetFiles are kept in private object storage and only ever streamed back as data.
5.3.2 Safe file pathsMetStorage keys are generated by the server — area, id, a random part, the extension — and checked against a strict pattern whenever one is read.

V6 Authentication

RequirementResultHow it is met
6.1.1 Anti-automation documentedMetThe operations documentation sets out the bot check, the attempt counters (per address and network, per network, per account), the edge rate limit, and why a stranger cannot lock someone else’s address.
6.2.1 At least 8 charactersMet8 minimum and 200 maximum, enforced on the server.
6.2.2 Password can be changedMetAccount → Change password.
6.2.3 Change needs the current passwordMetThe current password is required, and a wrong one counts against the attempt limit.
6.2.4 Common passwords refusedMetNew passwords are checked, case-insensitively, against the 5,000 most common of 8 characters or more, from the UK NCSC’s list.
6.2.5 No composition rulesMetNone.
6.2.6 Password fields maskedMetEvery password field is type=password. The sign-in, registration and administrator set-password fields also have a button to show what was typed.
6.2.7 Paste and password managers allowedMetPaste is never blocked, and fields carry the autocomplete hints password managers use.
6.2.8 Password checked exactly as typedMetNever trimmed, truncated or case-folded.
6.3.1 Brute-force defences in placeMetA bot check that fails closed, then an attempt counter claimed in one statement before any hashing: 10 failures per address and network in 15 minutes, 50 per network. Changing the password and deleting the account, which need a session, allow 10 failures per account in the same window. Two-step sign-in codes allow 10 wrong per account in the same window, and after 100 wrong in a row only a recovery code works. An edge rate limit sits in front.
6.3.2 No default accountsMetNone exists. The placeholder an empty database starts with has a password hash that cannot match anything.
6.4.1 Initial secrets expireMetEmailed links are random (128 or 256 bits), expire (a reset after 60 minutes, a confirmation after 2 days) and work once. A password set by an administrator, or generated for a new account, only lets its holder choose their own, and expires after 3 days.
6.4.2 No hints or secret questionsMetNone.

V7 Session management

RequirementResultHow it is met
7.2.1 Sessions verified by the serverMetEvery API request looks its session up on the server, by a hash of the token, with an expiry check.
7.2.2 Tokens generated per sessionMetA random reference token for each sign-in; no static keys.
7.2.3 Tokens unique, 128 bits or moreMet256 bits from a cryptographically secure generator.
7.2.4 New token at every sign-inMetSigning in issues a new token and ends the one the browser held. Changing the password issues a new token and ends every other; this device’s previous one answers for one more minute, for requests already in flight.
7.4.1 Ended sessions stay endedMetLogout deletes the session on the server, and expiry is enforced in the query that reads it.
7.4.2 Sessions end with the accountMetDeleting an account deletes its sessions and its calendar link. Roles are read afresh on every request.

V8 Authorization

RequirementResultHow it is met
8.1.1 Access rules documentedMetOwners, contributors and viewers, per-category sharing, share links and owner-only actions are documented with the code.
8.2.1 Function-level accessMetEvery API route requires a session except four kinds: those that start or recover one (sign-in, registration, the emailed confirmation and reset links, logout, and the check of whether one exists); the two payment webhooks, authenticated by signature; the share-link routes and the virus scan’s verdicts, each authenticated by its token; and the address browsers send reports of what a page’s security policy refused to, which grants nothing and changes nothing. Every administrative route checks the administrator role.
8.2.2 Data-level accessMetOwnership and sharing are part of every query’s conditions; someone else’s record answers “not found”. A file is checked through the record it belongs to, and an account’s photo by the same rule that decides who may see its name.
8.3.1 Enforced on the serverMetEvery rule is enforced by the server. The app only hides what the server would refuse anyway.

V9 Self-contained tokens

RequirementResultHow it is met
9.1.1 Signatures checked before useMet by a different routePolar’s webhooks are verified (HMAC-SHA256, constant-time compare). Apple’s signed notifications are never trusted at all: see below.
9.1.2 Algorithms on an allowlistMetAlgorithms are fixed in code. A token’s own algorithm header is never consulted, so “none” cannot be chosen.
9.1.3 Keys from trusted sourcesMetKeys come from server secrets and fixed hosts. No key or key address carried inside a token is followed.
9.2.1 Validity period honouredMetWebhook timestamps must be within 5 minutes. Apple’s signing dates order updates, so an old one cannot overwrite a newer one.

V10 OAuth and OIDC

RequirementResultHow it is met
10.4.1–10.4.5 Authorization server dutiesNot applicableEquiDiary is not an OAuth authorization server. It only uses others: Zoho for mail, and Google, Microsoft and Apple for signing in.

V11 Cryptography

RequirementResultHow it is met
11.3.1 No ECB or weak paddingMetNothing uses ECB or PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. The service encrypts two things itself: each account’s two-step sign-in key, with AES-256-GCM, and its backups, with age (ChaCha20-Poly1305).
11.3.2 Approved ciphers onlyMetAuthenticated encryption only.
11.4.1 Approved hash functions onlyMetSHA-256 for every hash and signature and every MAC but the two-step codes’, and argon2id for passwords — over the old PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash for an account whose password predates it; no MD5. SHA-1 appears twice: as the index Have I Been Pwned’s breached-password lookup is built on, where it names a range to ask for and protects nothing; and as the HMAC in two-step sign-in codes, the only one authenticator apps make, which NIST still approves as an HMAC.

V12 Secure communication

RequirementResultHow it is met
12.1.1 Current TLS versions onlyMetTLS 1.2 and 1.3, with 1.3 preferred. Check: a TLS 1.0 or 1.1 handshake with openssl s_client is refused.
12.2.1 TLS everywhere, no fallbackMetHTTPS on every host and HSTS set. Over plain http, a page is redirected and the API refused. The platform’s default workers.dev address is switched off.
12.2.2 Publicly trusted certificatesMetCertificates from Google Trust Services.

V13 Configuration

RequirementResultHow it is met
13.4.1 No source-control metadata exposedMetOnly the public folder is deployed: /.git/ and the configuration files answer 404.

V14 Data protection

RequirementResultHow it is met
14.2.1 No secrets in URLsMet by a different routeThe session, passwords and bot-check tokens travel in headers and bodies, and emailed links carry their token in the URL fragment, which browsers never send. Share links and calendar feeds carry a token in the address by necessity: see below.
14.3.1 Device cleared at the end of a sessionMetLogout deletes the offline journal, the queue of unsent changes and the cached photos before it contacts the server; offline, the session itself is ended at the next launch. A launch that finds no session clears them too, except changes typed on the device and never sent: those stay, and nothing else of the journal does, until the same account signs in again, and another account signing in deletes them.

V15 Secure coding and architecture

RequirementResultHow it is met
15.1.1 Remediation time frames documentedMetA high or critical advisory in code that ships is fixed within 7 days, a moderate one within 30, and dependencies are updated monthly.
15.2.1 Nothing past its deadlineMetFive packages are dependencies, twelve with what they pull in. On 28 October 2026, npm audit reported no known vulnerability in any of them.
15.3.1 Only the fields needed are returnedMetResponses name the fields they return, account data passes through one allowlist, and prices are masked for anyone not allowed to see them — even when they edit an entry.

Level 2

The requirements Level 2 adds to Level 1, assessed on 31 October 2026. Where one is not met, the row says so, and Not met, by choice gives our reasons.

V1 Encoding and sanitization

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
1.1.1 Input decoded onceMetEach piece of input is decoded once, by the part of the service that expects that encoding, before anything checks it: the address of a request, read in the one form every check and the routing share, the name of a stored file, and the text of research records from outside.
1.1.2 Encoding where it is usedMetText is stored as it was typed and escaped at the moment it is used: for the page when it is shown, for an email or the research page when it is built, for a calendar line when it is written, and for a file name when the download header is made.
1.2.6 LDAP injectionNot applicableThe service queries no LDAP directory.
1.2.7 XPath injectionNot applicableNo XML is parsed and no XPath is run; every integration answers JSON.
1.2.8 LaTeX injectionNot applicableThe service runs no LaTeX.
1.2.9 Regular expressions from dataNot applicableNo regular expression is ever built from data, so there is nothing to escape.
1.3.3 Cleaning for risky placesMetEach place where text could do harm has its own cleaning and length limit: names are kept to one line and 120 characters before they reach an email subject or a calendar, download names lose control characters and slashes, calendar text is escaped and folded as the standard asks, and text from outside services is reduced to plain text and checked before it is stored.
1.3.4 SVG imagesMetSVG files are never accepted. Uploads must be JPEG, PNG, WebP or PDF, and their first bytes must match the type they claim, so an SVG renamed as a PNG is refused.
1.3.5 Markdown, CSS and templatesNot applicableNo Markdown, stylesheet, BBCode or template language is accepted from anyone: everything is plain text, and colours come from a fixed palette.
1.3.6 Server-side request forgeryMetThe service never fetches an address a user gives it. Every outgoing request goes to a fixed list of hosts over https, a redirect is refused unless that service is known to send one (and then each step is checked), and the identifiers placed in those requests are checked against a strict pattern first.
1.3.7 Template injectionMetNo template is built from input. Emails and screens are fixed texts with named gaps that values fill, and a check fails any translation that adds a gap of its own.
1.3.8 JNDI injectionNot applicableThe service has no Java, and so no JNDI.
1.3.9 Memcache injectionNot applicableNo memcache is used. The one cache is keyed by the site’s own address and a language from a fixed list.
1.3.10 Format stringsMetThe code has no format strings. Values are placed into texts in a way that takes them literally, so a name containing special characters cannot change the text around it.
1.3.11 Email injectionMetMail is sent through the mail provider’s web API, not SMTP. Each message goes to one checked address, its subject is always one line, and every value in its body is escaped.
1.4.1 Memory-safe codeNot applicableEverything is TypeScript and JavaScript, which manage memory themselves; none of the five libraries that ship contains native code.
1.4.2 Integer overflowMetEvery number is checked against a range before use: ids, prices (up to a billion, so no total overflows), durations, repeat intervals, link lifetimes, video trims and page sizes. Requests for part of a file are matched to a strict pattern and kept within the file.
1.4.3 Freed memoryNot applicableThe runtime frees memory itself; there are no pointers to leave dangling.
1.5.2 Safe deserializationMetThe only format read is JSON, which creates no objects of a chosen type. Each field is read by name, a request is never merged into another object, and lookups use only an object’s own keys.

V2 Validation and business logic

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
2.1.2 Rules across fields documentedMetA table kept with the code lists every rule that ties two values together, such as a care plan that repeats or falls on one date but not both, and where each is enforced.
2.1.3 Limits documentedMetThe limits are written down, those per account (horses, attachments, video, storage, changes a day, emails, dictation) and those for the whole service (sign-ups per network, calls to the video service, the security log’s ceilings).
2.2.3 Related values checked togetherMetThe server checks that values make sense together: an entry’s horse, person and type, a person limited to some types, training-only fields, a trim within its video, a restricted share that names at least one type, and categories at most two levels deep.
2.3.2 Limits enforced as documentedMetEach documented limit is enforced on the server, and the ones that cap what an account adds are checked inside the very statement that adds the row, so parallel requests cannot slip past together. Tests race them.
2.3.3 All or nothingMetEach operation that writes several things writes them in one database transaction: an account and its first records, a password change, a share and the types it covers, a person and their types, a share link and its scope, and an account’s deletion. A file stored before its record is removed again if the record is refused.
2.3.4 No double-bookingMetEverything limited is claimed in a single statement: emailed links and invitations work once, daily allowances and per-minute rations cannot be overspent by parallel requests, one export runs at a time, and one App Store subscription belongs to one account.
2.4.1 Anti-automationMetA bot check guards sign-in, registration and password resets, one network opens at most ten accounts a day, and wrong passwords are limited. Each account may make 2,000 changes a day, and calls to the video service, the payment provider and Apple are rationed per account and for everyone; storage, video, dictation, emails, messages and exports have their own limits, and so does the security log.

V3 Web frontend security

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
3.3.2 SameSite set for the cookie’s purposeMetThe session cookie is SameSite=Lax: a browser sends it when someone follows a link into the app, and never with a request another site makes in the background or a form it posts. That suits it, because nothing changes on a plain page load and every change must come from the app’s own address (3.5.1). It is the only cookie the app sets.
3.3.3 __Host- cookie prefixMetThe session cookie is named __Host-eq_session, so the browser keeps it to the one host that set it and no other subdomain can set or replace it. No cookie is meant to be shared. The old unprefixed name is still accepted for sessions signed in before the prefix arrived, and swapped for the prefixed one on first use; those sessions end within 90 days of their sign-in.
3.3.4 Session cookie out of scripts’ reachMetThe session cookie is HttpOnly, so no script on the page can read it, and the session token reaches the browser only in the Set-Cookie header: no answer of the API carries it. The list of signed-in devices names each session by a short code the token cannot be worked back from.
3.4.3 Content Security PolicyMetEvery page carries one policy that names where scripts may come from (the app itself and Cloudflare’s bot check), with object-src 'none' and base-uri 'none', no inline script and no eval. Stored photos and videos carry a stricter, sandboxed policy of their own. Check: curl -sI https://app.equidiary.com.
3.4.4 nosniff on every responseMetEvery response the server sends carries X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff: pages, the API’s answers and refusals, scripts, stored files, redirects and the answers to plain http. Only the responses Cloudflare’s network makes itself, such as its rate-limit and error pages, lack it.
3.4.5 Referrer policyMetEvery page carries Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin, so another site learns at most which site a visitor came from, never the page: the address of a share link stays private. Links mailed for a reset or a confirmation carry their token after a #, which browsers never send anywhere. A PDF opened on its own carries no policy of ours and gets the browser’s default, which in current browsers is the same one.
3.4.6 Framing refusedMetEvery response says frame-ancestors 'none' in its Content Security Policy, so no other site can show any part of the app inside a frame. Nothing of ours is meant to be embedded.
3.5.4 Separate applications on separate hostsMetThe app is at app.equidiary.com, the website at equidiary.com and the test version at its own address behind a sign-in; videos play from the video service’s own addresses. The session cookie belongs to the app’s host alone and the website refuses to serve the app, so the website never holds a session. The same server answers both addresses, so a share link also opens on the website’s address and the website’s pages on the app’s; all are our own pages under the same policy.
3.5.5 postMessage origins checkedMetThe app’s one listener for messages is its offline worker’s, which keeps the reader’s language for use without a connection: it ignores a message from any other site, and any message that is not the address of a language file. None of the app’s pages listens for messages from other windows, and the bot check’s own script handles the messages from its own frame.
3.7.1 Only supported client technologyMetPlain JavaScript and standard browser features (a service worker, IndexedDB, audio recording). No plugin, Flash, Java applet or Silverlight anywhere, and the page policy forbids plugins outright.
3.7.2 Off-site redirects allowlistedMetThe server redirects only within its own addresses, and the app takes no redirect address from a link. The one place the app sends someone to another site by itself is subscribing or managing a subscription: the address comes from the payment provider’s own service, and the server passes it on only when it is a secure address on the provider’s domain.

V4 API and web service

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
4.1.2 Only pages redirect http to httpsMet by a different routeOver plain http a page is sent on to its https address, while the API and the calendar feed are refused with no redirect, so a program that sends a password or a token unencrypted fails where its developer sees it. Browsers never get that far: they are told to use https only. The one exception is a calendar link handed out for one-tap subscription before the app stopped offering it: those links are marked, their owners are asked to make a new one, and until they do a calendar’s plain-http request for one is redirected (details).
4.1.3 Proxy headers cannot be forgedMetThe server trusts only the fields Cloudflare’s network writes over whatever a visitor sends: the connecting IP address, its country and the request’s id. It reads no X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP or user header.
4.2.1 Request smugglingNot met, by choiceNo server of ours sits behind the network: Cloudflare’s edge and its runtime read every request before the app sees it, and the app passes no raw request on to another server. That parsing is Cloudflare’s engineering, which nothing in our code can test.
4.3.1–4.3.2 GraphQLNot applicableNo GraphQL, and no client sends a query: every filter is a fixed, checked parameter, a search is cut to 200 characters and matched as plain text, and one answer holds at most 1,000 entries.
4.4.2–4.4.4 WebSocketsNot applicableNo WebSockets.

V5 File handling

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
5.1.1 Upload rules documentedMetThe documentation lists every upload: photos (JPEG, PNG or WebP, 5 MB), PDFs (10 MB), videos (3 minutes a clip, 200 MB a file, handled by the video service) and voice dictation (4 MB, never stored). No upload accepts an archive, so nothing is unpacked. It also says how a stored file is served so it cannot run, how it is checked for viruses, and what happens to one that is caught.
5.2.3 Archives checked before unpackingNot applicableNo upload accepts a compressed archive, and the server unpacks nothing. The one zip, the account export, is one the server builds.
5.4.1 Download file namesMetA stored file is named by the server, never by the uploader, and every file is served under a name the server made. A file downloaded under a readable name gets that name cleaned, and keeps the extension of its checked type. The uploaded file’s own name is kept only as a wallet document’s title when none is typed, and never names a file.
5.4.2 File names encodedMetDownload names are written as RFC 6266 asks: control characters and slashes removed, a plain-ASCII version in quotes and the full name encoded as UTF-8 beside it. Other file names are letters, digits, dots, dashes and underscores only. No email carries an attachment.
5.4.3 Virus scanningMetEvery photo and document is checked with ClamAV, on current signatures, the night after it is uploaded. A file it matches is withheld from then on, wherever it would be served: to its owner, through share links and in the account export, and a device that had shown it checks again within a day. Until that first check a file can be opened, for a day or a little more. Videos are only ever served as the video service’s own re-encoding, never as uploaded.

V6 Authentication

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
6.1.2 Words to avoid in passwords documentedMetThe security inventory lists the words a guesser tries first: the app’s name, horse words in the app’s nine languages, and the account’s own address and names.
6.1.3 Every way in documentedMetThe security inventory lists every way into the service, what each one grants and what guards it: sign-in and its two-step code, registration, the emailed links, what an administrator can do to an account, share and calendar links, the payment providers’ notifications and the virus scan’s report.
6.2.9 Long passwords allowedMetA new password can be up to 200 characters. Signing in sets no limit, and no form cuts short what is typed.
6.2.10 No forced password changesMetA password never expires. Only one an administrator set has a deadline: its holder must replace it with their own within 3 days.
6.2.11 Context words refusedMetA new password that is little more than those words with digits and symbols added is refused, at registration, reset, change and when an administrator sets one.
6.2.12 Breached passwords refusedMetNew passwords are checked against Have I Been Pwned’s list of breached passwords, which receives only the first five characters of a hash. If that check cannot be reached, the password is allowed and the common-password list still applies.
6.3.3 A second factor for everyoneMet by a different routeTwo-step sign-in, a code from an authenticator app or a security key, is offered to every account and required of administrators. Why it is not required of everyone, and what stands in for it: see below.
6.3.4 No undocumented ways inMetEvery request needs a session unless its route is on a short public list, each one documented. With two-step sign-in on, every way to a session needs the code; a reset or an administrator setting a password creates no session.
6.4.3 Reset cannot skip two-stepMetThe reset link is random (256 bits), works once and expires after 60 minutes. Using it signs out every device, disconnects any Google, Microsoft or Apple sign-in and signs nobody in, and two-step sign-in stays on, so the next sign-in still asks for the code.
6.4.4 A lost second factorMetRecovery codes cover a lost phone. With those lost too, an administrator turns two-step sign-in off only on a request confirmed from the account’s own address, after typing their own password and code, and the owner is emailed. Signing in still takes the password, which is all that setting it up took.
6.5.1 Codes work onceMetAn authenticator code is accepted once, and no code for the same or an earlier 30 seconds is taken after it. A security key signs a random challenge that works once, and a key that counts its uses must count on. Each recovery code works once.
6.5.2 Recovery codes stored safelyMetEach recovery code carries 120 random bits, above the 112 at which a plain hash is enough, and only its SHA-256 hash is stored.
6.5.3 Codes from a secure generatorMetThe authenticator key (160 bits) and the recovery codes come from a cryptographically secure generator.
6.5.4 Codes long enoughMetRecovery codes carry 120 bits. No code is sent by email or text.
6.5.5 Codes short-livedNot met, by choiceLevel 2 asks an authenticator code to be accepted for 30 seconds at most. The service also accepts the 30 seconds before and after, up to 90 in all, for a phone whose clock is a little out. Each code still works once, and wrong codes are limited.
6.6.1–6.6.3 Codes by phone, text or emailNot applicableThere are none. The second factor is an authenticator app or a security key, with recovery codes.
6.8.1 One provider cannot speak for anotherMetA sign-in with Google, Microsoft or Apple finds the account by the provider and that provider’s own identifier for the person together, never by the email address. An address that already has an account is refused, never joined to it: its owner connects the provider from Account, after typing their password again.
6.8.2 Signed sign-in assertionsMetEvery sign-in token from Google, Microsoft or Apple has its signature checked against that company’s published keys before anything in it is read, with the one algorithm they use, whatever the token claims; an unsigned token is refused.
6.8.3 SAML assertions used onceNot applicableNo SAML.
6.8.4 Strength claimed by the providerMetThe service never relies on the provider for how strong a sign-in was: two-step sign-in, when it is on, is asked after Google, Microsoft or Apple as after the password. A provider is used to confirm it’s you only for an account that has no password; an account with a password is always asked for it. Where the provider says when its user last signed in, a sign-in older than 10 minutes is refused; where it does not say, its answer is taken to mean only that the browser could sign in to the connected account at that moment.

V7 Session management

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
7.1.1 Session lifetimes documentedMetA session lasts 90 days from sign-in and ends after 30 days unused. The documentation says why that is longer than NIST’s guidance (the app is used offline at the barn, and often only every few weeks) and what stands in for shorter sessions.
7.1.2 Parallel sessions documentedMetUnlimited, one per device. Every one is listed under Account → Signed-in devices, and none is ended to make room for another.
7.1.3 Federated sessions documentedNot applicableNo single sign-on or identity federation.
7.3.1 Inactivity timeoutMetA session unused for 30 days stops working, checked on every request. The app keeps no session alive on a timer, except to ask whether a video it is showing has finished converting.
7.3.2 Absolute session lifetimeMetEvery session ends 90 days after its sign-in, however much it is used. Nothing extends it.
7.4.3 Sign out other devices after a changeMetChanging or resetting the password, or an administrator setting one, signs out every other device by itself. Turning two-step sign-in on or off, or making new recovery codes, offers a button to sign out the others, and Account → Signed-in devices offers it at any time.
7.4.4 Log out always within reachMetAccount is in the top bar of every signed-in view, with Log out in it. The screen that makes someone replace a temporary password has its own Log out.
7.4.5 Administrators can end sessionsMetAn administrator can sign one account out of every device, or every account but their own current session, after typing their password and code again.
7.5.1 Sensitive changes need a fresh sign-inMetNo account can change its own email address. Changing the password, deleting the account, every change to two-step sign-in and handing a horse over to another account ask for the password, and with two-step on a code as well. An administrator changing another account’s address types their own password and code again first.
7.5.2 Sessions can be seen and endedMetAccount → Signed-in devices lists every session with its browser, system, country and last use. Signing one out, or all the others, asks for the password again, and the code with two-step on.
7.6.1 Federated re-authenticationNot applicableNo outside identity provider.
7.6.2 Sessions only by an explicit actionMetA session is created only by signing in, typing the two-step code or registering, each a form the person submits. Emailed links create none, and visiting the app signed out sets no cookie.

V8 Authorization

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
8.1.2 Field-level rules documentedMetA table kept with the code says, for every kind of data, who sees it: the owner, a contributor, a viewer, a share-link guest, any other account and an administrator. It includes what a share’s own settings hide (prices, the wallet, the details of a horse’s trips, the feeding plan), the owner’s own entry types, which everyone a horse is shared with sees, and when another account’s name and photo may be shown. Who may change what is written beside it: the feeding plan, the wallet and the care schedules are the owner’s alone, a writer kept from prices cannot set one, and a task changes only by whoever raised it or the horse’s owner.
8.2.3 Field-level access enforcedMetEach of those rules is part of the database query that reads or writes the data. A price, a wallet document, or another account’s name and photo never leaves the server for someone the owner has not allowed, even in the reply to their own edit. The share-link page returns exactly what it names: no prices, authors, wallet or tasks, and the feeding plan only when the link carries it.
8.4.1 Accounts kept apartMetEvery account is its own tenant. Each query carries the owner or sharing condition, and another account’s records answer “not found”. Deleting an account keeps what it logged on other owners’ horses and hands its own entry types to those owners. Once a helper’s access to a horse has ended, they can no longer rename the people or entry types of their own that label its owner’s entries.

V9 Self-contained tokens

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
9.2.2 Token type and purpose checkedMetA payment webhook changes a subscription only after its signature checks out, and only for subscription events. An App Store notification is used only to learn which subscription to look up, and of Apple’s answer only the transaction is read, for our own products. Each of the service’s own tokens is kept apart by what it is for, so a token made for one purpose works for no other.
9.2.3 Token audience checkedMetEach payment environment has its own webhook secret, so a delivery signed for another endpoint fails. Apple’s answer must name our app and one of our products.
9.2.4 Audience in the tokens we issueMetEach key we sign with serves one audience. The App Store key signs only requests to Apple’s subscription service, naming our app, for 30 minutes. The video key signs only playback tokens, each for one video, for 12 hours.

V10 OAuth and OIDC

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
10.1.1 Tokens only where neededMetSigning in with Google, Microsoft or Apple runs on the server: the service’s secrets and the sign-in token never reach the browser, and no access token from them is kept. One long-lived token is kept: Apple’s, for each account connected to Apple, because Apple expects the service to cancel the connection on Apple’s side when that account is deleted. It is stored encrypted, is used for nothing but that cancellation, and is worth nothing without the service’s own Apple key, which is not in the database. The one-time code only passes through the browser on its way to the server (in the iPhone app, from Apple’s own sign-in sheet; for Google and Microsoft there, it stays in the phone’s own browser sheet and never reaches the app), and is worth nothing without those secrets. The service is also a server-side client of Zoho’s mail, kept as the way back for the mail Cloudflare’s email service now sends. Its long-lived credentials are server secrets sent only to Zoho’s sign-in address, and the short-lived access token goes only to Zoho’s mail address, for one batch of mail. None of them is stored, logged or sent to a browser.
10.1.2 Flow bound to the sessionMetEach trip to Google, Microsoft or Apple carries its own random state, nonce and code verifier, and is tied to the browser that set out by a cookie: the provider’s answer is taken only when that browser brings it back, and only that browser can read how it ended, once, within 10 minutes. In the iPhone app, Google and Microsoft sign in through the phone’s own browser sheet, which is a second browser, so the same tie is held in three parts: the sheet starts only when the app itself opens it, never from a link sent to someone; the provider’s answer is taken only from that sheet; and how it ended can be read only by the app that opened the sheet, which is handed a one-time ticket through an address that only EquiDiary’s app can receive. Connecting a provider or confirming it’s you also comes back only to the session that asked. Zoho’s grant was made once, by hand, and is only renewed.
10.2.1 Forgery protection on the code flowMetPKCE for Google and Microsoft, and a random state for all three; Apple, which does not take PKCE, by its state and nonce.
10.2.2 Mix-up attacksMetEach provider has its own return address, and a code is only traded with the provider its trip was started for; each sign-in token’s issuer must be that provider’s.
10.3.1–10.3.4 Resource server dutiesNot applicableThe API accepts no OAuth access token: only its own session cookie, its own link tokens and the payment webhooks’ credentials.
10.4.6–10.4.11 Authorization server dutiesNot applicableEquiDiary is not an OAuth authorization server. As a client, each token request carries its client secret and asks only for what it uses: from Zoho the two permissions sending mail needs, from the sign-in providers the person’s identifier, email address and name.
10.5.1 Sign-in tokens not replayedMetEach trip sends a random nonce that the sign-in token must carry, and is spent by its outcome.
10.5.2 The person identified for goodMetAn account is found by the provider’s identifier for the person, which the provider never hands to anyone else, and never by the email address or the name.
10.5.3 The provider is who it saysMetEach token’s issuer must be the provider’s own, fixed in the code; nothing about a provider is looked up at run time.
10.5.4 The token is for this serviceMetA token must name this service as its audience, must not have expired, and must have been issued within the hour.
10.5.5 Back-channel logoutNot applicableSigning out at a provider does not sign anyone out here: EquiDiary keeps its own sessions.
10.6.1–10.6.2 OpenID Provider dutiesNot applicableEquiDiary is not an OpenID Provider.
10.7.1–10.7.3 Consent managementNot applicableThere is no authorization server, so there is no consent to collect, show or revoke.

V11 Cryptography

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
11.1.1 Key management policyNot met, by choiceKeys are managed through the lifecycle NIST SP 800-57 describes (generation, distribution, storage, use, rotation, destruction), and each key’s lifetime and what to do if it leaks are written down. The test environment holds a copy of four production credentials (the App Store key, the mail grant, and the video service’s token and signing key), one holder more than the requirement allows: see below.
11.1.2 Cryptographic inventoryMetA table kept with the code lists every algorithm, its settings, its key and where it is used, the site’s certificates included. A change that adds a key must update it, and the assessment is redone at least once a year.
11.2.1 Established implementationsMetCryptography is done by the platform’s built-in Web Crypto (BoringSSL), by the noble-hashes library for argon2id, and by age for the backups. Nothing cryptographic is written by hand.
11.2.2 Algorithms and keys can be changedMetEach stored password names its algorithm and settings and is upgraded at the next sign-in, as the move from PBKDF2 to argon2id was. The key that protects two-step keys can be replaced: the old one keeps opening them while each is sealed again under the new one. Every other key has written rotation steps.
11.2.3 At least 128-bit strengthNot met, by choiceEverything we choose reaches 128 bits: argon2id, HMAC-SHA256, AES-256-GCM, P-256, X25519, 160-bit two-step keys and 128- or 256-bit tokens. The video service’s RSA signing key, and the RSA certificate our hosting provider offers a client that asks for one, are sized by those providers at about 112 bits: see below.
11.3.3 Encrypted data protected from tamperingMetBoth things the service encrypts use authenticated encryption: each two-step key with AES-256-GCM, bound to its account, and the backups with age.
11.4.2 Password hashingMetargon2id with 19 MiB of memory, 2 passes and a random salt, which is OWASP’s recommended minimum. An older hash is upgraded at the next sign-in, or wrapped in argon2id by a nightly job.
11.4.3 Hashes strong enough for integrityMetEvery signature and MAC uses SHA-256. SHA-1 appears only as the HMAC in two-step codes, which needs no collision resistance, and as the breached-password service’s index, which protects nothing.
11.4.4 Keys derived from passwordsNot applicableNo key is derived from a password: passwords are only ever checked, and backups are encrypted to a public key.
11.5.1 Random valuesMetEvery secret comes from the platform’s cryptographically secure generator: 256 bits for sessions and emailed links, 128 bits for share, calendar and invite links, 160 bits for two-step keys. Recovery codes, at 120 bits, follow the authentication chapter’s own rule for them.
11.6.1 Approved signature algorithmsMetSignatures use ECDSA P-256 and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, both with SHA-256, on keys Apple and Cloudflare generate; the sign-in providers’ tokens are checked as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 only. The backup key comes from age’s own key generator.

V12 Secure communication

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
12.1.2 Strong cipher suites onlyNot met, by choiceUnder TLS 1.2, our hosting provider’s default still accepts a few suites without forward secrecy and a few CBC suites with SHA-1, beside the strong ones that current browsers negotiate first. Restricting them is a paid add-on we have not bought.
12.1.3 Client certificates checkedNot applicableNo connection is authenticated with a client certificate.
12.3.1 Encryption on every connectionMetEvery connection into and out of the service uses HTTPS, and the backup server is administered over SSH. A plain-http request is redirected to https if it is for a page and refused if it is for the API.
12.3.2 Certificates checkedMetEvery outgoing connection checks the server’s certificate, and nothing switches that check off, on the service or on the backup server.
12.3.3 Encryption between our own partsMetThe one network link between our own parts, the backup server reporting to the service, is HTTPS. The database, the file store and the speech service are reached inside the platform, not over a network.
12.3.4 Trusted certificates between our own partsMetThose links use publicly trusted certificates. We run no certificate authority of our own and no self-signed certificate.

V13 Configuration

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
13.1.1 Connections documentedMetEvery outside service the server talks to is listed, with why, how the connection is authenticated and what it sends, and so is everything that connects in. An automated check fails when the list and the code differ. No address a user types is ever fetched.
13.2.1 No long-lived keys between componentsNot met, by choiceThe payment, mail, bot-check, video and summary services issue only long-lived keys, and the backup server reaches its storage and the service with long-lived keys too. Each is held by one party, limited to what its use needs, and replaced every year; the backup server’s keys to our hosting provider work only from that server’s addresses.
13.2.2 Least privilege between componentsMetEach key can do only what its use needs: the payment key creates checkouts and billing-portal sessions, reads prices and ends the subscription of an account being deleted, and the backup’s key to the file store only reads. The backup runs as a user of its own rather than as the server’s administrator, can write only its own folders, and is handed its keys in memory for each run.
13.2.3 No default credentialsMetNo service uses a default password or key. Every secret is generated at random or issued by its provider.
13.2.4 Allowlist of outside servicesMetThe server can reach only a fixed list of outside hosts, over HTTPS, and follows no redirect except where a service is built to send one, checking each step against the list. An automated check refuses any outgoing request that bypasses it.
13.2.5 Server held to that allowlistMetThe list is enforced in the one function every outgoing request goes through, the summary service’s library included. Files and data are read only from the platform’s own storage.
13.3.1 Secrets in a secrets managerNot met, by choiceThe service’s secrets are in the hosting platform’s secret store, which cannot be read back, and none is in the code. The backup server keeps its keys in a file only its administrator can read, rather than in a vault; the backup gets a copy in memory for each run, and its keys to our hosting provider work only from that server.
13.3.2 Least privilege for secretsNot met, by choiceThe test environment uses the same video, mail and App Store accounts as production, so its keys reach production’s. It deploys only what the owner pushes to it and answers only behind an access check.
13.4.2 No debug mode in productionMetThere is no debug mode, debug route or source map in production. An unexpected error answers “Internal error”, and the details go only to our own logs.
13.4.3 No directory listingsMetNo folder is ever listed: a folder’s address shows the not-found page, or on the app’s address, the app.
13.4.4 No TRACEMetThe service answers no TRACE request, and the hosting platform refuses the method before it arrives.
13.4.5 No internal documentation or monitoring exposedMetNo API documentation is published, and the internal documents are not deployed. Every administrative and monitoring route needs an administrator who has passed two-step sign-in.

V14 Data protection

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
14.1.1 Data classifiedMetEverything the service holds is classified as secret, confidential, internal or public, down to two-step sign-in keys, video playback tokens, the addresses a horse is shared with and the IP address passed to the bot check. The classes follow the GDPR, the UK GDPR and Mexico’s data protection law.
14.1.2 Protection requirements per classMetEach class has written requirements for transport, use, logging, encryption at rest, integrity and how long it is kept.
14.2.2 Not cached on serversMetAPI answers are marked never to be stored, and files as for the reader’s own browser only, so no shared cache keeps them. The only pages the server caches are the public research digest’s.
14.2.3 No trackersMetThere is no analytics service or tracker, and the only outside script is the bot check. Personal data goes only to the companies the privacy notice names.
14.2.4 Protection applied as documentedMetEach class’s requirements are what the code does: secrets stored only as hashes or encrypted, addresses kept in logs only in scrambled form, accounts logged by number, nothing logged while an address carrying a link’s token is served, and each store emptied on its stated schedule.
14.3.2 Not cached in browsersNot met, by choiceAPI answers, the data download, the calendar feed, wallet documents and a share link’s files are never stored by the browser. Photos and PDF attachments are kept in its cache, and shown for a day without asking again, until signing out clears that cache.
14.3.3 Nothing sensitive in browser storageNot met, by choiceThe app keeps the journal, the changes still to send, and the photos and PDFs it has shown on the device, because it is used at the barn without signal. All of it is wiped at sign-out and when the app opens without a session; wallet documents and videos are never stored there.

V15 Secure coding and architecture

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
15.1.2 Software inventoryMetEvery library that ships is listed, five direct and twelve in all, each pinned by version and checksum and fetched from the public npm registry. The build tools, the one outside script and the backup server’s packages are listed with their sources.
15.1.3 Costly functions documentedMetEach expensive function is listed with what bounds it: the data download, password hashing, dictation, uploads, sign-up, the video service’s shared call budget and the research digest among them. Long work is streamed or split, so no answer outlasts its caller.
15.2.2 Costly functions boundedMetEach bound is enforced: bot checks, attempt limits, daily caps per account, one data download at a time, size limits, and a per-account and an overall ration of calls to the video service, which also pauses all but deletions when that service says the shared budget is spent.
15.2.3 Nothing extra in productionMetTests, scripts and internal documents are neither deployed nor served, the platform’s preview addresses are off, and the test environment’s shortcuts do nothing in production.
15.3.2 Redirects not followedMetOutgoing requests follow no redirect, except a video download, where the video service sends one by design; each step is held to the list of allowed hosts.
15.3.3 No mass assignmentMetEvery field a request may set is read by name and checked; nothing else in a request reaches the database.
15.3.4 Real client IPMetThe client’s address is taken only from the header the hosting platform sets and overwrites, and one a client sends is ignored. Limits per network count an IPv6 address by its /64.
15.3.5 Types checked, comparisons strictMetThe server is type-checked in strict mode, every input is checked for its type before use, and comparisons are strict.
15.3.6 No prototype pollutionMetKeys a client chooses are looked up only among an object’s own properties, collections use maps, and request data is never merged into an object.
15.3.7 No parameter pollutionMetRequest bodies are JSON only, each value is read from one named place, and a repeated parameter counts once.

V16 Security logging and error handling

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
16.1.1 Logging inventoryMetThe security documentation lists every place a log is kept: the security log, the account log, the attempt and request counters, the platform’s log of the server’s output, the alert mail, the daily check-in, the encrypted backup, the backup server’s own logs, and the hosting provider’s record of the requests its rate limit blocks. For each it gives the format, what is in it, who can read it and how long it is kept, and it defines every security event recorded.
16.2.1 Entries say when, who, where and whatMetEach security record notes the time in UTC, the account it concerns and the administrator acting, the route and the records it reached for, the network (in scrambled form) and the country, the outcome, and the request’s ID, which finds the same request in the platform’s log.
16.2.2 Times in UTCMetEvery log stamps its time in UTC, the backup server’s included, and the admin screen shows each time in UTC and says so.
16.2.3 Logs go only where documentedMetThe server writes logs only to the stores the inventory lists, and every outbound connection is checked against a fixed list of hosts that the build holds to the documentation. No log goes to an analytics service.
16.2.4 Logs can be read and joinedMetThe platform keeps each line as a JSON event, and security records are printed with named fields. Every record of a request carries the request’s ID, which joins the database log, the platform’s log and the error alerts.
16.2.5 Sensitive data kept out of logsMetPasswords, tokens and keys are never logged. Email addresses and networks are kept only in scrambled form, and accounts by number. Error text from other services has addresses masked, and nothing is printed while a share or calendar link is served, because the platform files every line under the address it was printed for. Query strings are redacted.
16.3.1 Every sign-in event loggedMetRegistrations, sign-ins (naming the second factor used), a correct password waiting for its code, failed sign-ins, lockouts, logouts, password changes and resets, the password typed again before a sensitive action, two-step changes and wrong codes, recovery codes, and another server’s credential refused are all recorded.
16.3.2 Failed authorization loggedMetEvery refusal for lack of a right is recorded, and so is every “not found” answered to a signed-in user, which is how another account’s records answer, with what was reached for. So are links that match nothing, a share-link visitor asking for a file the link does not cover, and an App Store subscription claimed by a second account.
16.3.3 Documented events and bypass attempts loggedMetThe documented list of events is the list the code writes, and the build fails if the two differ. Input refused, failed bot checks, lockouts, limits reached, oversized requests, cross-site writes and dead links are all recorded, within an hourly cap per source that stops a flood from filling the log.
16.3.4 Errors and failed controls loggedMetUnexpected errors are logged with the route, the account and the request’s ID, and mailed to operations once an hour per kind. A service that fails, its connection refused or its answer wrong, is logged in its own words, and a security record the database would not take is still printed.
16.4.1 No log injectionMetRecords are written as bound parameters and hold codes, numbers and scrambled values rather than free text. The platform keeps each line as one JSON event, so a value cannot start a second entry. Alert mail and the admin screen escape what they show.
16.4.2 Logs protectedMetOnly administrators who have passed two-step sign-in can read the security log, and no answer contains a scrambled value. The database refuses any change to a record, and any deletion before its 90 days. The platform’s log is readable only by the account’s one member, who signs in with a second factor, and the server can add to it but not change it.
16.4.3 Logs copied to a separate systemMetEvery security record is printed to the platform’s log as it is written, a store the application can add to but not change or empty, so a takeover of the application could not erase that copy. The whole log also leaves every day, encrypted, for a backup server at another provider, and alerts go to a separate mailbox and a dead-man’s switch. Records made while a share or calendar link is served are the exception: they reach the backup the next day.
16.5.1 Generic error messagesMetAn unexpected error answers “Internal error”, and a database conflict a general sentence. Every message is written in the code, and another service’s own words go only to the log. No stack trace, query, key or token is returned.
16.5.2 Outside services failing safelyMetA provider outage switches off its feature, never a control. The bot check fails closed; the breached-password check gives up after 3 seconds and the common-password list still applies; a video whose playback link cannot be issued is shown without it; the research digest falls back to a second AI model and its pages to the published copy; the video service is left alone for five minutes after it refuses; alert mail is throttled.
16.5.3 Failing closedMetEvery check refuses when it cannot decide: the bot check, the attempt limits (claimed before any password is checked), sessions, webhook signatures and the virus scan’s token. Limits are tested inside the database write that would pass them, and a change in several steps is written all at once or not at all.

V17 WebRTC

RequirementResultHow it is met, or why not
17.1.1 TURN serverNot applicableNo WebRTC, so no TURN service. Videos are uploaded over HTTPS and played in the video service’s player; dictation records a clip and uploads it.
17.2.1–17.2.4 WebRTC media serverNot applicableNo media server, DTLS or SRTP.
17.3.1–17.3.2 WebRTC signalingNot applicableNo signaling server, and no WebSockets.

Met by a different route

Three kinds of address hold a secret because the address is the product. A share link is something an owner sends to a buyer or a clinic. A calendar feed is what Google Calendar, Apple’s Calendar or Outlook subscribe to, and they keep only an address. A video’s playback link is signed by the video service, which puts the signature in the path.

What protects them: share and calendar tokens are 128 random bits, stored only as a hash, read-only, and can be revoked or replaced at any moment; a share link can also expire and be limited to some categories or a start date. A video’s link is valid for at most 12 hours and for one video. The service prints nothing to its logs while serving these addresses, query strings are redacted from the logs, and the referrer policy keeps a page’s address out of the requests it makes to other sites.

One weakness remains, and it belongs to Level 2 (4.1.2): a calendar app handed a webcal:// address may make its request over plain http, and calendar apps ignore HSTS. The app now hands out only the https address and says where each calendar takes it pasted, rather than offering one-tap subscription. A link made before that was offered as webcal://, and a calendar subscribed with it keeps asking for that address until the link is replaced. The app marks those links and asks their owners to make a new one; until they do, a plain-http request for one is redirected to https, while a plain-http request for any other calendar link is refused, like the rest of the API.

Apple’s signed payloads (9.1.1)

Two of Apple’s signed objects reach the server, and the contents of neither are taken from anyone untrusted. A notification about a subscription is read only to learn which subscription to look up; nothing in it is stored. The state is then fetched from Apple’s own API, so a forged notification can at most cause a fresh read of the truth. The transaction inside that API answer arrives over TLS from Apple’s fixed address, in reply to a request we signed, and is held to our app’s bundle id and product list.

Checking Apple’s certificate chain as well would meet the requirement to the letter. We decided against it: it would add a certificate parser to the code that ships, and change nothing about what is trusted.

Two-step sign-in, offered to everyone and required of administrators (6.3.3)

Level 2 asks for a second sign-in factor on every account, and allows an application to relax that with a documented reason and the controls that stand in for it. Two-step sign-in, a code from an authenticator app or a security key with recovery codes beside it, is offered to every account and required of every administrator, whose tools do not open without it.

We did not make it compulsory for everyone. Many owners sign in rarely, often at the barn, and a lost phone without its recovery codes would lock them out of their horses’ records. What stands in for it: wrong passwords are limited per address and network, a new password is checked against the most common and the breached ones, a session ends after 30 days unused, and changing the password or deleting the account asks for the code whenever two-step is on.

Not met, by choice

Ten Level 2 requirements are not met. Each is a decision we recorded, with what limits it:

Questions or findings: support@equidiary.com, as described on the security page.

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